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Abstract 
 
This paper offers a comparative overview of the case studies included in this Special Issue with 
the aim of providing a narrative of how the refugee emergency in Europe has unfolded during the 
period 2014-2016. I look at the ‘real’ events as they happened, identify which events were taken 
up in the different national political scenes and media landscape as highly relevant, and then 
identify on the basis of a meta-analysis of the findings of the different papers, the main 
interpretative frames used to make sense of the refugee emergency. This meta-analysis allows 
me also to relate the discourses with the actual policies adopted or decisions taken with a view to 
addressing the emergency. The paper focuses on contrasted discourses, how they are politicised 
in different countries and how they are eventually brought together adopting a frame of 
‘reason’/rationalisation that reconciles solidarity with public order.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this special issue has been to investigate how the massive asylum seeking and 
migrant flows of 2014-2016 has been covered and debated in different European countries more or 
less directly involved in managing the refugee emergency, and even in countries that hardly 
received  any refugees such as Britain or Poland. Contributions to this special issue have not been 
designed in a strictly comparative way but have rather focused on the periods and events that were 
of particular significance in each country. For instance, for South-Eastern and Central Eastern 
European countries the closure of the Hungarian border on 15 September 2015 was a major tipping 
point, while for Italy the shipwrecks outside Sicily on 12 and 18 April 2015 when more than 800 
people on board of that ship lost their lives was a terrible experience. For Greece a crisis event was 
the closure of the Balkan route on 18 February 2016 and the debate over excluding Greece from 
Schengen, which was largely discussed during that period. We have focused on a variety of media, 
including the press, TV but also social media – particularly Twitter – and speeches/programmes of 
political leaders and political parties. Our aim has been to precisely analyse how the mediatisation 
and the politicisation of the ‘refugee crisis’ have been closely intertwined and how they have 
unfolded in each of the countries under study. 
The special issue has started from the premise that there is an interactive relationship between 
specific events that take place and their coverage and de-/re-construction through media and 
political discourse. In other words there is an interactive link between factual events and related 
representations and speech events. Thus we covered the immediate arrival and transit countries at 
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the southern and south-eastern corner of Europe, notably Greece and Italy, as well as the transit 
countries along the Balkan route, notably Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. In Central Europe we have 
included Poland as the most extreme case of a country where the crisis was a matter of heated 
debates despite no actual lived experience thereof (hardly any immigrants or refugees entered the 
Polish territory). We also looked at Austria, one of the major recipients of asylum seekers heading 
north where a culture of welcoming supported by civil society and left wing parties shifted to an 
attitude of exclusion after specific events in the fall and winter of 2015. The study is complemented 
by an analysis of (social) media and political discourses in Germany and Sweden, two of the major 
final destination countries (together with Austria) in northern Europe, and also the UK – a reluctant 
host of a few thousands of refugees.  The discourses  (re-)contextualise and represent these events 
in a variety of ways. Attention is paid in this paper to check whether some crisis events had a wider, 
transnational resonance and provoked shifts in coverage and/or political arguments such as, for 
instance, was hypothesised with regard to the tragic death of little Aylan Kurdi, his brother and their 
mother who drowned outside the Turkish coast on 5 September 2015 seeking to cross to Greece. 
The papers included in this special issue share a critical discourse analytic perspective which 
shows how different events have been represented by different media in different countries, using 
sometimes opposed strategies of legitimation while calling to the same values. Thus, for some, 
compassion and solidarity involves keeping the refugees in Syria and its neighbourhood with 
adequate care and money, so as to prevent them from losing their lives on their way to Europe while 
for others it means providing them sanctuary in the EU. In some countries their earlier experiences 
of seeking refuge from civil war or ethnic violence symbolised their duty to help the people fleeing 
the Syrian conflict, while in other countries these historical experiences were used precisely to 
highlight differences and reject responsibility. National discourses were internally diversified as 
different political parties and civil society actors adopted opposed viewpoints. Naturally a common 
element that surfaces in the papers included in this Special Issue is the relevance of domestic 
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politics, upcoming national or regional elections and the Left and Right wing dimension as well as 
the ways right-wing populist and radical right parties instrumentalised this situation (e.g. Wodak 
2015). 
My aim in this comparative overview is to pull these different threads together and to provide a 
narrative of how the crisis has unfolded – the ‘real’ events as they happened, identify which events 
were taken up in the different national political scenes and media landscape as highly relevant, and 
then identify on the basis of a meta-analysis of the findings of the different papers, the main 
interpretative frames used to make sense of the refugee emergency. Such meta-analysis is necessary 
as I do not have access to the primary data that are in different languages, and of different discourse 
genres. This meta-analysis allows me also to relate the discourses with the actual policies adopted 
or decisions taken with a view to addressing the emergency. 
A note of style is in order here – I am using interchangeably the terms ‘refugee crisis’ and 
‘refugee emergency’ to speak of the massive asylum seeker and irregular migration flows that 
Europe has witnessed during the period 2014-2016. I realise that the term refugee crisis is contested 
by many civil society actors but it allows us to refer to this set of events in a concise way. In 
addition it is my view that this was a multiple ‘crisis’: a crisis in terms of unprecedented volume 
and pace of refugee and migrant flows but also a crisis in terms of the receiving countries’ asylum 
reception policies. A crisis for EU politics and policies as it brought to the fore the divergent views 
of different member states. Last but not least, it was a positive ‘crisis’ to the extent that it triggered 
a dramatic wave of solidarity and voluntary help by citizens and non-governmental organisations 
and later a dramatic rise of suspicion and ‘asylum panic’ (for a critical discussion on the policy 
responses see: Triandafyllidou & Mantanika, 2017).  
The section that follows offers an overview of the flows and main events during the period 
analysed, notably between early 2015 and mid 2016. Section three turns to the comparative analysis 
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of the discourses. Last but not least the final section highlights how the politicisation and 
mediatisation of crisis events in Europe today is taking a new turn.  
2. A Crisis Unfolding 
According to UNHCR data, there were 1,015,018 arrivals by sea to Europe through the 
Mediterranean, during 2015, with 61 per cent originating the journey from the world’s top-refugee 
producing countries, notably Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan. Most of these 
arrivals were recorded at the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea – at the Greek-Turkish border 
(Eastern Mediterranean route), with a smaller number at the Italian coasts (in Sicily and 
Lampedusa, the (Central Mediterranean route).  
As the situation in Syria and the neighbourhood has been deteriorating since 2013 and the 
emergence of the ISIS, refugee flows towards Europe started increasing dramatically not only to 
neighbouring countries in the region and Turkey but also via Turkey to Greece and Italy seeking to 
travel further north to other European countries. At the same time as conflict and violence persisted 
in places like Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, and Yemen, as well as Nigeria, flows from both East and 
West Africa increased as well. The event that marked a new period in the Mediterranean refugee 
emergency was a deadly shipwreck with over 250 victims south of Lampedusa in September 2013. 
Following such massive loss of human lives, the Italian government decided to implement a big 
Search and Rescue operation, labelled Mare Nostrum, which involved sending military ships to 
patrol near Libya with the aim of saving small boats in distress. Thus, the year 2014 turned out to be 
a crisis year for Italy with significant irregular migration and asylum seeking flows via Libya (and a 
total number of arrivals standing at 170,000). The opposition parties accused the Italian government 
for creating a call effect through the Mare Nostrum operation, as migrant smugglers hurried to 
overload unworthy dinghies with tens or hundreds of people, reassuring them that once at sea they 
call the international emergency number and would soon be rescued by the Italian navy. 
 
Figure 1 Here 
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Figure 2 Here 
 
In the fall 2014, Italy sought EU solidarity to cover for the costs of Mare Nostrum (which 
amounted to 11 million Euro per month), and hence a decision was taken at EU level to downsize 
and transform it into a European operation named Triton, whose budget and mandate were however 
significantly narrower. Migration and asylum seeking pressures across the Central and Eastern 
Mediterranean continued, particularly from Syria, leading to a change in smuggling strategies from 
then onwards. Old large commercial vessels were loaded outside the port of Mersin in South-
Western Turkey and sailed all the way to southern Italy. This trend lasted for a few months in late 
2014/early 2015 while at the same time Greece experienced also a notable increase in flows, mostly 
of Syrians, from Turkey to the Aegean islands. 
In spring 2015 it became apparent that a massive asylum seeking and perhaps also irregular 
migration emergency was developing as the pathways re-activated by Syrians from Turkey to 
Greece were increasingly travelled also by Iraqis and Afghans. Pressures along the Libya – Italy 
route continued leading to yet another massive shipwreck with over 800 people dying on 21st April 
2015. This event prompted the European Council for urgent action which led to the adoption of 
Operation Sophia, aimed at destroying smuggling networks and particularly vessels, including 
possibly also interventions in Libyan territory. The European Commission also imposed emergency 
relocation quotas for distributing asylum seekers from the frontline countries (Greece, Italy and 
Hungary) to all the member states. 
Pressure and tensions kept rising in late spring as flows unfolded: several hundreds of 
persons, mostly families including young children and women, crossed from Turkey to the Greek 
islands each day during the summer of 2015. At the same time a formerly used but little travelled 
smuggling route from Turkey via the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Serbia 
and Hungary to Austria and Germany was activated. A true Balkan path was created as people took 
the train or bus or simply walked through the Balkans crossing borders and reaching Austria, or 
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Germany while several headed towards Sweden – a country with at least until then a particularly 
welcoming policy to Syrian asylum seekers (see Krzyżanowski & Rheindorf; and Wodak, this 
Special Issue). 
As both EU institutions and national governments were taken aback by these developments, 
flows continued to grow, leading to intensive discussions at national and EU level on how to 
manage this ‘refugee crisis’. Two tragic events marked the late summer of 2015. The discovery of a 
truck on an Austrian motorway on 28 August 2015 with the decomposing bodies of 71 people 
including four children, and the death of a young Syrian Kurdish boy, Aylan Kurdi, his brother and 
their mother in their attempt to cross from Turkey to Greece. The picture of the body of little Aylan 
washed out on the Turkish coast was posted in the social media, and became viral in a matter of 
hours. It was republished in mainstream press and led to a huge wave of empathy and solidarity 
with the plight of Syrian refugees.  
The famous political statement of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel ‘Wir schaffen das’ 
(we can do this) declared on 31st August 2015, referring to Germany’s capacity and ability to 
receive high numbers of Syrians seeking asylum in the country marked an important point in 
European solidarity. The welcome rhetoric was adopted also by the then Chancellor of Austria 
Werner Faymann. The EU institutions followed suit increasing the 60,000 relocation quotas decided 
in May 2015 (amidst by then already usual strong contestations by Central Eastern European 
member states) to 120,000. However, the Hungarian government decided to stop the transit of 
asylum seeking flows through the country and closed its border on 15 September 2015. Within a 
single week (15-22 Sep 2015), it also built a 175-km long fence of barbed wire to seal off its border 
with Serbia.  
This caused public outcry among most member states, particularly in the west and south, 
while it also diverted the refugee flows to Croatia and Slovenia which were suddenly confronted 
like FYROM and Greece to massive transit flows. The main destinations however remained the 
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same, notably Austria and Germany. The media in different countries reported strong scenes of 
solidarity and empathy with the people on the move, particularly at train stations in Munich and 
Vienna. The pressure of the huge flows was of course deeply felt in the Aegean islands where the 
number of people transiting reached extraordinary proportions in September, October and even 
November 2015 despite inclement weather. The island of Mytilene, one of the main points of entry, 
received each day between three and five thousand people a day during that period. In mainland 
Greece too though citizens showed solidarity and there was a huge mobilisation of volunteers and 
donations of food, clothing, toys and so on. 
During the same period the first EU Turkey joint action statement was published which 
requires from Turkey better controls at its side of the Greek Turkish sea border with a view to 
limiting the flows while the European Commission promised to contribute 1 billion Euro to help 
Turkey bear the costs of its hosting of already more than 2 million of Syrian asylum seekers. Turkey 
asked for three billion Euros and the European Commission was inclined to give such a high 
amount provided the Turkish government limited the flows. The joint statement was issued on 15 
October 2015, but not much happened on the ground. 
 
 
Figure 3 Here  
 
It soon became obvious though that both national governments and EU leaders started 
perceiving the asylum seeking and irregular migration flows as unsustainable. Balkan countries, 
both those which are members of the EU like Croatia and Slovenia and those who are not notably 
FYROM and Serbia, started showing signs of intolerance, Hungary maintained its starkly anti-
refugee position and government rhetoric, while Austria and Sweden started reconsidering their 
welcoming policies. This led to the tightening of rules for Syrian asylum seekers in Sweden on 24 
November 2015 and to discussions about liming the daily flows at the Slovenian Austrian border 
and putting an overall cap to the asylum seeking applications that Austria would admit (see 
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Rheindorf & Wodak, this issue). Despite criticisms by other member states, Austria went on to put a 
cap to asylum seeking applications for 2016 that would be not more than 37,500. 
Another important EU policy development during spring 2015 was the launch of the 
“hotspot approach”1 established both in Greece and Italy. This was introduced by the EU 
Commission in its proposal for a European Agenda on Migration2 and can be summarised as 
identification, registration, and fingerprinting of incoming migrants as procedures that take place in 
specific camps at the borders. In Greece, there are five hotspots operating on the islands to screen 
and channel newcomers to the adequate procedures. In Italy, there are four hotspots operating in the 
area of Sicily and southern Italy. However, the ‘opening of the Balkan route’ in fall 2015 limited 
their role to simple registration centres that would allow people to move to Athens and the Greek 
mainland and continue their journey across the Greek-FYROM border.  
Figure 4 Here 
 
As flows continued unabated despite the harsh winter weather, Austria decided to close its 
borders with Slovenia and limit the asylum seeking flow (for detail, see: Rheindorf & Wodak, and 
Vezovnik in this issue). All countries along the Balkan route followed suit in closing their borders 
and thus refugees were stranded in Greece, many of them stopped at the Greek Northern land 
border with FYROM, Eidomeni. 
The sealing of the Balkan route came about in February 2016, after a regional agreement 
among police authorities of a coalition of EU member-states and non-EU countries. At the meeting 
held in Zagreb, on the 18th of February 2016, and as a follow-up to the meeting held in Skopje, on 
3rd February 2016, the Heads of Police Services of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of 
Slovenia, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Serbia, and the Republic of Macedonia agreed 
that the migration flow along the Western Balkans route has to be reduced to the greatest possible 
extent.  The agreement mainly affected the Greek-FYROM crossing point. FYROM authorities had 
already started allowing passage to only specific nationalities notably those judged more likely to be 
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asylum seekers (Syrians, Iraqis, Afghans) in late January. In late February all people on the move 
were blocked at the Eidomeni border crossing and the Balkan route was interrupted. Soon after, and 
as flows from Turkey to Greece diminished gradually, the EU and particularly Germany and 
Chancellor Merkel undertook intensive negotiations with Turkey with a view to limiting the flows 
while still at the Turkish coast preventing people from crossing to Greece. On 19 March 2016 the 
EU-Turkey Agreement came into force blocking the crossing of asylum seekers and irregular 
migrants at the Turkish coast – all people arriving in Greece after that date were to be returned to 
Turkey. During this period between early February and late March, there were also intensive 
discussions on whether one ‘solution’ helping to stop the flows towards northern and western 
Europe would be to expel Greece from the Schengen area. 
The closure of the Balkan route and the EU-Turkey agreement reduced the Turkey-Greece 
flows to a handful of people per day compared to the thousands of the previous months. Those who 
arrived after 19 March have been kept on the islands while, however, very few have been returned 
to Turkey, as Greek asylum committees found their asylum claims admissible (thus indirectly not 
recognising Turkey as a safe country for these people) and are currently awaiting for their cases to 
be processed by the Greek asylum system. Flows from Italy to Turkey continued however unabated 
during 2016, with total arrivals standing at 180,000 for 2016, and approx. 5,000 by early March 
2017. In September 2016 an EU-Afghanistan conference was held in Brussels with a view to 
ensuring the latter country’s cooperation in admitting Afghan citizens whose asylum application 
had been rejected. Currently there is discussion at EU level about an EU-Libya agreement amidst 
revelations of tragic conditions at Libyan militias’ impromptu jails where migrants from Sub 
Saharan Africa are held upon the payment of ransom by their families back home or made to work 
under slave-like conditions to pay for their liberation. 
 
2. Debating the Crisis 
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The papers included in this Special Issue cover media and political discourses that refer to 2015-
2016. As the above short overview of the migrant/refugee flows’ evolution and related policy 
developments has shown, there were several turning points where actions and discourses of both 
national and EU authorities were influenced by the massive and (then) continuing character of the 
flows and the lack of effective means to tame them. These responses in policy and political actions 
soon entailed various subsequent “discursive shifts” (Krzyżanowski, 2013; Krzyżanowski in this 
Special Issue) and policy changes, and effectively led to policies/actions becoming legitimised by 
political and mediated discourses (Zhao & Djonov. 2017).  
There was clearly a shift from seeking to manage and to channel the flows distributing 
responsibility through quotas in spring and fall of 2015, to the construction of the refugee flows as 
an effective emergency, a crisis that called for more drastic measures. These policy developments 
were obviously in an interactive relationship with developing media and political discourses as well 
as civil society mobilisations around the refugee crisis. Contributions to this special issue focus on 
the mediatisation of the refugee flows, notably the representation of the flows and of the specific 
events that took place in the summer, fall and winter 2015 and in early 2016) in the media – both 
the traditional mass media (Press, television) and social media (notably Twitter) which are used by 
parties and governments as direct channels for defending their decisions. They also however 
examine the politicisation of the issue, notably the way in which the refugee flows and the related 
policy challenges have been intertwined with national party-political discourses and their internal 
political competition in each country. We clearly see these different factors as inter-related in the 
(re)production of the political and media discourse on the refugee emergency.  
Media and political debates as (re)produced in media, in speeches, in Twitter posts, were 
nationally and regionally contextualised in  relation to the positioning of each country as a frontline 
or final destination, as directly or peripherally involved; and also historically and politically 
contextualised in terms of past experiences of seeking or offering refuge and hosting migrants (or 
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lack thereof), and in relation to current challenges including Euro-scepticism (see contributions to 
this Special Issue). 
The landscape thus of the overall politicisation and mediatisation of the crisis has been complex 
and with overlapping contextualisations and intertextualisations. My aim in this concluding paper is 
to highlight how the actual flow of events compares with the importance each event is given in the 
different national media and political landscapes, and also to identify the common interpretive 
frames that are shared across the countries under study.  
 
 
2.1 Turning points of a shared European story-line 
 
Contributions in this Special Issue cover different sections of the wider period during which the 
refugee emergency has been unfolding, notably between the early 2015 and the Spring 2016, while 
most papers concentrate on the peak times in the period between July 2015 and January 2016. 
Naturally the choice of the specific periods to be covered pertains to the authors and their contextual 
judgement on which was a really crucial period during which the politicisation and mediatisation 
strategies adopted by political leaders and the media can be analysed and when public discourse 
accelerated (see Table 1 for an overview). 
 
Table 1 Here  
 
Connecting the methodological choices of contributors to this Special Issue to the actual 
evolution of events (see our overview in the previous section) allows us to identify how each set of 
national media and/or national political leaders ‘hooked’ upon a specific event that is nationally 
relevant, along a longer shared story-line of the refugee emergency. As earlier research has shown, 
international crisis events are debated by national media in different ways that resonate with 
national discourses while also intertwining with common European discursive elements 
(Triandafyllidou, Wodak, & Krzyzanowski, 2009).  
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We can re-tell the story-line of the refugee emergency through the nationally important 
events that mark this one year period from April 2015 till March 2016: The first event that marks 
the beginning of the crisis is the massive shipwreck once again south of Lampedusa in April 2015 – 
an event that has naturally marked the highpoint in Italian discourse and which was chosen by the 
Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi to elaborate on Italy’s role and future policies in his speech in 
Parliament on 22 April 2015. 
The second major event is the death of the little boy Aylan Kurdi in the crossing from 
Turkey to Greece in early September 2015. Effectively, the relevant event is not the drowning of the 
little child but rather the diffusion through the social and traditional media of his picture which 
came to symbolise the tragedy of the Syrian people in particular but also more widely of those 
fleeing war seeking refuge to Europe. The picture highlighted how the victims were innocent 
(children) and defenceless humans. It showed them as unable to influence their own fate and thus in 
thrall to ‘forces’ of, on the one hand, traffickers and smugglers in the process of getting to Europe 
and, on the other, (mainly national yet largely uncoordinated) political actions steering the process 
upon their arrival. 
The third main event which is widely shared as a landmark, a turning point for the countries 
along the Balkan route, is the erection of a fence at the Hungarian-Serbian border on 15 September 
2015 – for the first time fences and barbed wire enter the representation of the refugee crisis. This 
along with the actual ‘march’ of the refugees across the Balkans is the main event that organises the 
politicisation of the refugee crisis in Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and Poland.  
The fourth event, which is however closely related to the closure of the Hungarian Serbian 
border is the massive welcome of refugees by many citizens who meet them up at the train stations 
of Munich and Vienna in September and October 2015, offering clothes, toys, food, and hospitality. 
This is a major event that organises the coverage in Austria and Germany even if later the discourse 
shifts away from hospitality and openness. 
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The fifth event is the Cologne incidents on New Year’s Eve: a number of young women 
celebrating New Year’s Eve in the main Cologne square in Germany are assaulted by groups of 
young men looking foreign (dark skin, dark hair, looking ‘Arab’) who steal their cell phones and 
wallets and also abuse them. While there is no confirmation that the perpetrators are asylum 
seekers, the first testimonies and media representations signal that some of them could be part of the 
recent arrivals. These events on New Year’s Eve in Cologne signal a turning point – a re-
contextualisation of the refugee emergency in terms of body politics, the emergence of a ‘sexual 
nationalism’ where the nation, the homeland, or Europe is represented as a young and innocent 
woman assaulted by these foreign, evil men. 
The Cologne incidents are tightly linked to the eventual closure of the Austrian borders and 
subsequent closure of the Balkan route – which both have important resonances with the Austrian 
and German debates. They become however important for Greece too as they not only create an 
additional emergency – people are stranded in Greece, just before the Greek-FYROM border in the 
North but force also Greece to take a stance. And while the Greek government refuses to close its 
border with Turkey upholding its obligation to offer asylum, it has to come to terms with the 
dilemma and the pressure, simultaneously being threatened with expulsion from the Schengen 
treaty. These two related events, the closure of the Austrian borders and the subsequent complete 
closure of the Balkan route become thus matters that represent more widely the belonging to the 
European Union. 
The papers in this Special Issue highlight how these shared important events are re-
interpreted within each national public sphere with a view of defining what is really at stake for 
each country and how it should be dealt with. Having reviewed the analysis provided in each paper, 
the section below identifies on the basis of meta-analysis of the specific findings on each country 
the two main interpretive frames (Snow et al. 1986; Triandafyllidou & Fotiou, 1998; Verloo, 2005) 
that define in the different countries what is at stake and what should be done about it. While the 
Refugee crisis 
 
 
14 
 
different papers adopt different methodologies and tools for analysis, they all belong to the wider 
critical discourse analysis perspective and thus allow us to use their findings for a critical analysis 
of relevant interpretive frames. 
 
2.2 Interpretative frames: what is at stake and what should be done about it 
 
While usually frame analysis (Snow et al. 1986; Verloo, 2005) is adopted on the basis of the 
primary media or other (e.g. policy) textual materials, I am proposing here to use it for the meta-
analysis of the findings of the specific case studies included in this volume. The reason is that while 
the coverage offered is comprehensive and wide, it would be impossible to analyse the primary 
materials through a common dataset or coding scheme and method given the fact that they exist in 
different languages and cover different genres of discourse (from Twitter messages to long 
parliamentary speeches). However, there are some findings that clearly emerge in terms of what is 
at stake, what is the suggested course of action to address the issue and who is to blame.  
As the paper by Vollmer on Germany aptly epitomises in this special issue, the ‘refugee 
emergency’ is defined by a representation of people on the move. The flows that are massive and 
desperate. References to small boats unworthy of sailing at high seas, images of people being 
rescued from the sea but also of dead corpses, become typical images and references that construct 
the emergency. As Colombo with her paper on Italy rightly stresses in this special issue, what has 
been an emergency for already a couple of years is transformed into a crisis, both at the discursive 
level but also at the level of factual information (thus proving that it ‘becomes’ crisis only once 
sufficient conditions of both politicisation and mediatisation are in place, see Introduction to this 
Special Issue). The representation of the refugee emergency soon moves on and from dinghies 
passes to people marching, walking across borders, travelling from Greece, through FYROM, 
Serbia and Hungary (or later through Serbia to Slovenia) and moving on to Austria and Germany, 
with their feet. Occasionally also by train and bus taking routes that were hitherto forgotten local 
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connections among petty traders or families in the region – routes that had no major economic or 
political significance in the post-1989 period. 
Alongside these actual effects of hundreds of thousands of people moving across the Turkey-
Greece corridor and the Balkan route up west and north, the emergency is defined also by a legal 
fact: the Dublin Regulation that establishes the first safe country principle (asylum applications 
must be treated at the first safe country where the person arrives, in this case it would have been 
Greece) is de facto interrupted. Governments and border guards only acknowledge this exceptional 
situation. They do not seem to fight against it even if several measures are taken at the EU level 
already since spring 2015 in the effort to manage the mounting flows of asylum seekers from the 
Middle East and elsewhere. These two sets of events – an actual event of people travelling by boat 
and on foot, and the legal ‘events’ – the disruption of border controls, the de facto interruption of 
the Dublin regulation and also the disruption of the Schengen area regulations which foresee that 
controls are strict at the external EU borders as people then enter a no-internal-border zone set the 
scene for the refugee emergency and make it into a common, Europe-wide public issue. It is worth 
noting that parallel international organisations like the Interntional Organisation for Migration 
(IOM) step in in producing knowledge on the crisis. The IOM establishes a new data centre in 
Berlin, the GDAC-IOM, with the main aim of assembling and producing data on all migration and 
refugee crisis but particularly on what is labelled ‘the Mediterranean crisis.’ Thus the crisis comes 
into being also at the level of governance.  
The challenge is high for the frontline countries like Greece and Italy but also for the transit 
countries in the Balkans and the final destination countries particularly Austria, Germany and 
Sweden that start receiving an extraordinary number of people applying for asylum in their 
territory. Two competing interpretive frames emerge to discuss the emergency: the moralisation 
frame and the threat frame.  
 
Moral Responsibility/Solidarity vs Threat/Exclusion 
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The first is a moralising frame which puts the responsibility of the flows to wars, conflict, 
and violence in the regions of origin. The people moving are seen as victims, they are almost 
represented as deprived of agency. It is the flow that moves (see the paper by Vezovnik on the 
Slovenian media coverage, in this special issue) and is directed north, not the single individuals. 
Asylum seekers are personified only to present their tragic plight. Responsibility, if any, is 
attributed to the human smugglers who put people in unworthy dinghies, crammed together and 
send them off taking advantage of their desperation to make their criminal profit. At the same time 
little blame is put on European (national and EU) politics whose indecisiveness in responding to the 
‘crisis’ situation should be largely perceived as one of key foundations for the refugee plight. 
This frame emphasises European values through different strategies of recontextualization. 
Italy’s Prime Minister makes reference to Christian solidarity. He directly quotes: I knocked at your 
door and you welcomed me, while also making reference to the very statements of Pope Francis 
(see Colombo in this Special Issue). Solidarity is present in most countries as a higher moral 
ground, an obligation of Europe to stand true to its humanitarian values of providing protection to 
those persecuted, for showing its humanity.  
The moral values frame takes a different twist in each country – thus in Greece the left wing 
Prime Minister emphasises through his Twitter messages and speech in Parliament that the country 
remains true to the European ideals despite criticisms and despite the high costs. The same is true 
for the Social Democrat parties in Sweden and Austria which both during fall 2015 upkeep this 
view of solidarity with refugees. In Germany the discourse is inspired by empathy towards the 
asylum seekers. In these countries references to values are used to represent Europe as standing 
together in front of a common challenge. They are what makes Europe both united in diversity and 
distinct. 
By contrast, in Croatia and Serbia (see: Sicurella in this Special Issue) – the most recent EU 
member state and a country that does not yet belong to the EU – public intellectuals accuse 
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‘Europe’ (western, northern Europe, the EU institutions) for not upholding these European values of 
humanitarianism. They assert that these values are in crisis in Europe but not in their own countries. 
Thus values also become a criterion of European-ness, turning the argument on its head.  
In Austria and in Germany the frame is further reinforced by notions of deservingness; 
territorial borders are thus contextualised as morality borders too. These people deserve protection 
because they are fleeing war. This framing is replicated in Poland albeit in a clearly negative tone: 
the asylum seekers are not deserving of solidarity and protection because they are bogus refugees, 
in reality they are economic migrants. Interestingly it is only public intellectuals as analysed in the 
paper on Croatia and Serbia that offer a reflection on World War II, persecution and providing 
refuge – arguing that Europe must not forget and must uphold its solidarity and humanitarianism 
values.  
The second interpretive frame identified across media and political speeches in the countries 
under study is the frame of ‘Threat’. The asylum seeker flows are like a natural disaster – they are 
fall upon one unexpectedly. They cannot be managed and are unpredictable. This frame is strong in 
Poland and Slovenia in particularly but is also present in the UK and Austria as the emergency 
unfolds and the flows continue unabated. The ‘jungle’ in Calais as the symbol of ‘threat’, going out 
of control and even health risks is mobilised in the British Twitter discourses analysed by Bennett 
in this Special Issue. 
The threat frame is a common frame mobilised often in today’s globalised and 
interconnected ‘risk’ society (Beck, 2001). In Poland and Slovenia specific risks for public health 
from unknown – now forgotten in Europe – diseases and the inability of health services to cope.  
The strategy of personification (“Us” versus “Them”) is used in this frame to clearly oppose 
“us” – the natives, the Europeans – to “them” – the migrants, the newcomers, the non-deserving 
ones. In the frontline countries like Italy and Greece ‘them’ is also Europe – which has left them to 
deal with the emergency, without sufficient solidarity or support. In Poland, the “Us versus Them” 
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strategy is adopted not only to emphasise Poles versus ‘western Europeans’ but also to juxtapose 
Poland from Sweden (look how they have become, they have sharia law in many provinces – 
because they did not protect their borders) as well as Germany (the Germans are responsible for 
these large migrant flows).  
In conclusion, the threat frame mobilises both feelings of uncertainty and divisions within 
Europe. By contrast to the moralisation frame which refers to shared European values and to a 
common representation of us and them together, in solidarity and even empathy, the threat frame 
uses opposition to argue that this is a ‘zero sum’ game: what migrants / refugees ‘achieve’ comes at 
the expense of the natives who welcome them.  
 
Rationalisation: Reconciling Solidarity with Order 
 
While one might expect that there are simply two competing representations of the refugee 
emergency that are determined by the ideology and overall left vs right positioning of the political 
leaders/media outlets, and by the position of each country as frontline/transit vs. final destination, 
what emerges from all the papers is that eventually these competing perspectives are reconciled 
through the frame of rationalisation. 
Rationality and efficiency in managing the crisis are used as an interpretive frame to identify 
what the problem really is (about the refugee emergency) and what should be done about it. Thus, 
for instance, the Italian Prime Minister Renzi or the Austrian Chancellor Faymann refer to 
rationality to justify their decisions. Renzi speaks of Italians as practical people who do not reason 
with their stomach, or emotions but with their technical expertise in his speech to Parliament in 
April 2015. He uses this strategy to reconcile unlimited Christian solidarity with limited capacity to 
welcome and support the high number of asylum seekers arriving in the country’s shores. Faymann 
progressively builds his argument from one of ‘if there is not sufficient capacity to host the 
refugees, we will create it’ to subscribing to the argument that it is ‘irresponsible’ to accept so many 
people, eventually concluding in January 2016, that Austria can only accept 37,500 new asylum 
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seekers per year and once this number is reached, it will close its borders. The upper limit is 
justified through an interpretive frame of rationality, distancing thus the debate from moral 
arguments about human rights while also however refusing to endorse the threat frame. In both 
countries concerns about retaining votes play an important part. Faymann seeks to remedy the bad 
results at the regional election while Renzi seeks to keep the allegiance of those voters who start 
worrying about Italy showing ‘too much’ solidarity. 
In a similar vein, the Swedish Social Democrat party and its leader conclude ‘we are a small 
country and have done enormously a lot’ hence while we uphold our principles and tradition of 
human rights and providing asylum, we have to limit the number of people we can accept and hence 
we have to close our borders.  
Interestingly this frame is also adopted in the UK, which has hardly received a high number 
of asylum seekers: An open extrovert economy does not mean that the national borders should be 
open. An important element in the rationalisation frame is control and order: preventing things from 
getting out of control, re-introducing order. Thus responsibility and order become a necessary 
ingredient for solidarity. Solidarity cannot be irresponsible, too idealistic, not taking into account 
effective constraints. Thus the rationalisation frame endorses solidarity. The rule of law and public 
order is necessary to defend the values of liberalism that Europe cherishes which include human 
rights and providing protection to those who need it.  
Rationalisation provides both ex post legitimation (see: Rheindorf & Wodak this issue) and 
precedes the policy, pre-emptying opposition and preparing the ground for it (see: Krzyzanowski on 
Sweden and Colombo on Italy, in this issue). Rationality is indeed an inherent feature of western 
modern civilisation and thus resonates across countries and provides fertile ground for a European 
discourse on the refugee emergency, beyond the different positions and interests of each country. 
Rationalisation is an interpretive frame that avoids left wing versus right wing tensions. It thus 
eventually solves the big moral and political dilemma of Europe allowing political leaders and the 
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media to present political and policy decisions as both true to the European values of 
humanitarianism, solidarity, asylum but also taming the influx of newcomers that are feared to drain 
resources and destabilise social cohesion. Assistance must be provided but while making sure that 
security and order prevail and the rights of ‘natives’ are not impaired by the dynamic 
immigration/refugee situation. 
 
 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
 
This Special Issue provides for a critical review of the politicisation and mediatisation of the 
refugee crisis in different European countries. It brings together countries like Greece and Italy that 
were at the frontline of arrivals, with those countries that found themselves in the middle of the 
Balkan route, quite unexpectedly and dramatically, notably Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia, along 
with the final destination countries that bore the brunt of the emergency notably Austria, Germany 
and Sweden. It also includes a traditional destination of asylum seekers, notably the UK, which 
however has received very low number of arrivals in this period, and Poland, a central-eastern 
European country that was not touched by the refugee flows nor has a significant immigrant 
population but where a perceived and constructed refugee crisis emerged for the first time as an 
important political issue. 
The aim of the different chapters has been to provide for a critical analysis of the politicisation 
and mediatisation of the refugee emergency, organising their analysis usually around important 
crisis events. In this paper, I have tried to juxtapose the actual unfolding of the refugee emergency 
over the period spring 2015 to spring 2016 – notably from the dramatic increase of the flows and 
the huge shipwreck in April 2015 south of Italy to the signature of the EU Turkey agreement – with 
the ways in which different events were signalled as important turning points in the different 
countries. The comparative overview suggests that while there is a common story line of events that 
are relevant in all countries, the selection of what is the turning point has more to do with the 
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geographical and political proximity / relevance of the event for each country (e.g. the closure of the 
Hungarian Serbian borders for Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia, or the closure of the Austrian borders 
and the overall Balkan route for Greece) but also with the ways in which this event resonates with 
underlying national themes and historical legacies, such as notions of who we are and what are our 
values, what are the common European values, what is the positioning of the country in the wider 
European geopolitical context, and of course the left wing versus right wing positioning of the party 
and political leader speeches and Twitter strategies analysed.  
Two contrasted interpretive frames emerge initially that clearly signal a set of divergent 
positions between traditional left wing and right wing political forces: thus Socialist, Social 
Democrat and other centre-left or left wing parties and media adopt the moralisation frame 
upholding notions of solidarity and providing protection despite the massive character of the flows, 
while right wing and far right wing politicians in particular adopt an interpretive frame of threat and 
risk, using this frame to create divisions within Europe and to juxtapose their nation to the asylum 
seekers/migrants, but also to other European countries.  
However this political tension and disagreement is eventually solved by the mobilisation of the 
rationality interpretive frame. Both the partisans of risk and closure, and the supporters of solidarity 
and humanitarianism, can agree on the need for being rational, practical, and able to manage the 
emergency. While for those supporting the risk frame, the rationalisation frame comes in as the way 
to avert risks and seal off the borders – this is what it means being rational and efficient, for those 
supporting the morality and values frame, rationalisation means being responsible and effective. 
Thus taming solidarity and empathy with the notion of responsibility and order. Eventually 
solidarity and order are reconciled, allowing for parties and the media to argue that they were not 
betraying the European values but clarifying that in order to stay true to those values and implement 
them properly, there is a need for closure and re-establishing control and order. This interpretative 
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frame becomes almost super-partes, it is not politically or ideologically tainted. It becomes as the 
obvious, rational, responsible thing to do.   
Interestingly this frame is in some countries used to prepare the ground for decisions to be taken 
(for Sweden, see Krzyzanowski in this Special Issue) while in other countries to justify decisions 
already taken (for Austria, see Rheindorf & Wodak, in this Special Issue, or the UK, see Bennett) 
and yet in others to accuse the government for not taking action (as in the case of the opposition 
leader in Greece, see Dimitrakopoulou & Boukala in this Special Issue). This is an issue that would 
require further research, notably on how frames may be both used to foreground decisions and 
‘solutions’ while they may also be used to legitimise ex post the course of action chosen.  
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Notes 
                                                          
1 For a more detailed overview of how the EU Parliament presents this approach, see ‘On the 
frontline: the hotspot approach to managing migration’, (2016). Retrieved from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/556942/IPOL_STU(2016)556942_EN.
pdf. 
2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Commitee and the Committee of the Regions. Retrieved from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-
information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf, consulted on 3 
October 2016.  
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Figure 1: Arrivals across the Mediterranean 2015 
 
 
Source: Source: IOM data, Missing Migrants Project, Infographics, made available upon request to IOM on 
29 November 2016, https://missingmigrants.iom.int/infographics 
 
 
Figure 2: Arrivals across the Mediterranean 2016 
 
 
Source: IOM data, Missing Migrants Project, Infographics, published on 18 October 2016. Retrieved from: 
https://missingmigrants.iom.int/infographics 
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Figure 3: The Balkan route via Hungary 
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Figure 4: The Balkan Route (path via Slovenia and Croatia) 
 
 
 
Source: European Asylum-Seeker Crisis: Scenarios, 4 November 2015, ACAPS (www.acaps.org ), p.4. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Overview of sampling strategy and materials analysed 
 
Countries Period 
covered 
Sampling strategy Press TV Twitter Speeches 
Greece 5 Feb to 20 
Mar 2016 
Exclusion of Gr 
from Schengen – 
crisis event 
X  X X 
Italy 2014-2015, 
22 Apr 2015 
Wider period and 
crisis event: 
Shipwreck with 800 
victims 
X   X 
Austria 1 Apr 2015 
to 21 Jan 
2016 
Wider period with 
crisis events: 
Closure of 
Hungarian borders, 
High number of 
asylum applications, 
Cap for asylum 
applications, Closure 
of Austrian borders 
X    
Germany Spring 2015-
Early 2016 
Wider period of 
refugee flows 
X    
United 
Kingdom 
Three 2-
week periods 
July, Sep 
2015, Jan 
2016 
Crisis events: 
increase of flows, 
Aylan Kurdi, 
Closure of Austrian 
border 
  X  
Poland 16 Sep, 23-
24 Sep, 12 
Oct 2015 
Crisis events: 
Closure of 
Hungarian border 
and decision of 
quotas at EU 
Council 
X  X X 
Sweden 1 Nov-15 
Dec, and 24 
Nov 2015 
specifically 
Crisis event: 
tightening of asylum 
policy – party twitter 
and speech 
X  X  
Serbia 1-30 Sep 
2015 
Crisis event: closure 
of Hungarian border 
   X 
Croatia 1-30 Sep 
2015 
Crisis event: Closure 
of Hungarian border 
   X 
Slovenia 20 Aug to 31 
Dec 2015 
Wider period when 
refugee flows cross 
through Slovenia 
 X   
  
